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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIMARY ELECTIONS-RACIAL Dis-
CRIMINATION BY POLITICAL PARTIES.--Promptly after the decision
of the Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional a statute of the
state of Texas prohibiting Negroes from voting in a Democratic party
primary election,' the Texas Legislature passed- the statute herein
questioned vesting in the State Executive Committee of a political
party the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members
and to determine who shall vote at primary elections.2 The commit-
tee of the Democratic party passed a resolution disqualifying Negroes
from voting at a Democratic primary. The plaintiff, a Negro, having
been prevented from voting at a Democratic primary, brought suit
against the election judges for their refusal to allow him to vote.
Held, four judges dissenting, the resolution of the State Executive
Committee came within the prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments and was therefore void. Nixon v. Condon, 286
U. S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484 (1932).
A political party is merely a voluntary association and has the
inherent power to determine its own membership.3 The primary
elections are the private affairs 'of the political parties despite the
control of the state legislature over the nomination procedure at the
primaries.4 This seems to be the view of the state courts. However,
the federal courts, with the exception of that in Texas, 5 incline to the
theory that a primary is part of the regular election system. 6 If the
Texas primary is to be regarded as part of the election system, it
must have its foundation in the recognition of the State Executive
Committee as an agency of the state.7 Whatever inherent power a
state political party has to determine the content of its membership
resides within the state party convention.8 Here, however, the state
chose the executive committee to exercise that power, and did, there-
fore, make a grant of power to the State Executive Committee,9
thereby constituting the committee an agency of the state. The state
convention never voted to bar Negroes from the party, hence what-
ever power the committee exercised was not derived from the party,
but was delegated by the state. As was said by Justice Elliott of the
Supreme Court, "the facts and circumstances of the particular case
must not be overlooked." The result to the Negro is the same
whether as in Nixon v. Condon, the rule of exclusion is adopted by
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446 (1927).
'TEx. REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 3107.
Waples v. Marrast, 108 Tex. 5, 184 S. W. 180 (1916); Koy v. Schneider,
110 Tex. 369, 218 S. W. 479 (1920).
Supra note 3.
'Grigsby v. Harriss, 27 F. (2d) 942 (S. D. Tex. 1928) ; Nixon v. Condon,
34 F. (2d) 464 (W. D. Tex. 1929), affd, 49 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931).
'West v. Bliley, 33 F. (2d) 177 (E. D. Va. 1929).
" MERIAM AND OVERCRACKER, PRIMARY ELECTIONS (1928) 140.
" Stephenson v. Commissioners, 118 Mich. 396, 76 N. W. 914 (1898); 2
BRYCE, MODERN DEMocRAcIEs (1924) 40.
'See Love v. Buckner, 49 S. W. (2d) 425, 426 (1932).
RECENT DECISIONS
the political parties as organs of the state, or by the legislature itself
as in Nixon v. Herndon.10 Where a state attempts to do by indirec-
tion what it may not do directly, the validity of the act may be
questioned.11
R. L. L.
CONTRACTS-AGREEMENT TO COMMIT A TORT UNENFORCEABLE
-PUBLIC PoLICY.-Plaintiff contracted for passage on the Graf Zep-
pelin from Germany to New York. He knew that the exclusive news
rights of the flight had been acquired by a third party. As a condition
of being given passage he had agreed that he would give no interviews
and send no reports of said passage. Plaintiff thereafter contracted to
supply defendant with news through a pretense of answering mes-
sages from his friends. As a defense to this action defendant
set up the fact that the contract was made in violation of the terms
of the contract of passage. Held, the contract was in effect a con-
tract to commit a tort. The court will not aid one who has com-
mitted a tort to recover from another the price agreed to be paid
for his wrongful act. Reiner v. North Anterican Newspaper Alli-
ance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932).
The law is ever anxious to safeguard and to protect the in-
terests of parties in existing contractual relations from intentional
and wrongful interference by strangers. An action will lie for
intentionally inducing a breach of contract without excuse or jus-
tification.1 Such conduct is considered a tort since it is a fraud
upon the parties and the public and is against public policy.2 The
contract for the exclusive news of the trip made between the owners
of the Graf Zeppelin and third parties was interfered with by the
contract between plaintiff and defendant. Such contract was in
effect a contract to commit a tort. The courts will not aid one who
has committed a tort to recover from another the price agreed to
be paid for the tortious act.3 The courts are called upon to make
a choice between two evils-either to enforce the contract in favor
of the tort feasor and allow him to recover for his unlawful act,
" Supra note 1.
'Supra note 6. See also Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 262; Note (1930)
- HARV. L. REv. 467; Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 423, for comments on Nixon
v. Condon as decided by the federal courts before reaching the Supreme Court.
'Lamb v. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Campbell
v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914 (1923); Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254
N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930).
-Materne v. Horwitz, 101 N. Y. 469, 5 N. E. 331 (1886).
23 WmIusTo, CONTRACTs (1924) §1753.
